

SOCIAL MEDIA LANDSCAPE

**ahead of the 2022 general election
in Bosnia & Herzegovina**

26 October 2022



Key findings

- Social media posts focused on domestic issues, mainly on hostility towards specific politicians and ethnic groups.
- Identity politics dominates, with the overarching "us vs. them" narrative most prevalent.
- Respectful online discussions are scarce, with responses more often antagonist than initial posts.
- Narratives on (1) the election and (5) Milorad Dodik, Republika Srpska and Bosnian-Serbs from all social media audiences were the most common topics in our findings.
- Milorad Dodik and to a lesser extent Željka Cvijanović are predominantly supported by accounts that self-describe or are assessed as Bosnian-Serbs, in stark contrast to other social media audiences who were categorically critical.
- Narratives on electoral law changes was largely linked to Bosnian-Croats. Most social media audiences were critical of the Bosnian-Croat supported electoral law change, however some audiences had a more positive or neutral stand - including some international audiences.
- Social media posts connected to Bosniaks ranged in support. Some Bosnian-Serb audiences pushed narratives of historical revisionism, questioning historical Bosniak identity.
- Social media accounts purporting to be Bosnian-Serbs tend to see Russia as a cultural brother and economic partner. Bosniak and much of the international community see Russia as a destabilising force. No narratives from Bosnian-Croats accounts were detected.
- "Brain drain" is a concern among people from all ethnic groups, causing hopelessness to rise.



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Introduction

This report aims to depict how the social media landscape looked ahead of the 2022 Bosnia & Herzegovina general election and how the political environment manifests online.

As part of the Election Observation Mission (EOM) in Bosnia & Herzegovina carried out by the Danish NGO Silba - Initiative for Dialogue and Democracy, 60 social media posts were collected by the 39 international short term observers (STOs) deployed by Silba, in the two weeks leading up to the election.

This was done to better understand the social media landscape surrounding Bosnian politics and based on the thesis that the social media landscape of Bosnia & Herzegovina

BiH's social media landscape reflects the political landscape; polarized and extreme.

reflects the political landscape; polarised; extreme; susceptible to disinformation and misinformation, and; aggressive towards women (Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2022). And that this would be particularly visible towards the election.



Political environment


The political and electoral system in Bosnia & Herzegovina is often described as the world's most complex (Brezar, 2022). It was created after the Bosnian war and signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995, and is based on three ethnicities; Bosniaks, Bosnian-Serbs, and Bosnian-Croats, giving each equal rights and room in the political and electoral system. This has however not created harmony, stability and progress for the country but rather ethnic tensions and political stagnation, and many believe that the level of instability in Bosnia & Herzegovina is at its highest since the Bosnian war. As a result of this, the Office of High Representative (OHR) has become increasingly active causing further consternation amongst Bosnians (Kurtic, 2022). Concurrent with this, the rhetoric in all aspects, especially online, is getting more and more hostile and aggressive when it concerns politics.

Methodology

60 social media posts (see appendix 1) were collected by STOs and a qualitative content analysis (Mayring, 2000) was then made. A deductive approach was taken in terms of developing categories in which the posts have been divided. The nine categories are based on the political environment and the most talked about topics related to the election in Bosnia & Herzegovina. This being;

1. Narratives on Bosnian-Serbs
2. Narratives on Bosnian-Croats
3. Narratives on Bosniaks
4. Narratives on feelings of hopelessness
5. Narratives on the election
6. Narratives on OHR
7. Narratives on the International Community
8. Narratives on Russian influence
9. Other

“Other” in this case includes both examples of aggression against women and of assessed dis- and misinformation, since this is well documented, but we haven't been able to identify clearly to analyse thoroughly in this data set.



QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS

The categories with most content are category number 5, narratives on the election, and category number 1, narratives on Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik and Bosnian-Serbs.

This is unsurprising, as much conventional media coverage is also dedicated to Republika Srpska, and in particular Milorad Dodik.

To a lesser extent Bosnian Croats and the HDZ party are talked about in mainstream coverage, and this has largely been reflected in our social media coverage.

Narratives on Bosnian-Serbs

The narratives on Republika Srpska are highly influenced by the narratives of its key spokespeople, Milorad Dodik and Željka Cvijanović. Initially, Milorad Dodik rose to power in Republika Srpska with reformist ideas and strong support from former Secretary of State in the US, Madeleine Albright, who described him as “a breath of fresh air” (Sarajevo Times, 2022 & NPR, 2022). However, narratives on the Bosnian-Serb leader, Milorad Dodik, have changed drastically. Milorad Dodik is now seen in the view of the general public as one of Vladimir Putin’s pawns (Sarajevo Times, 2022b & Gutić, 2022). The story from moderate reformist to hardcore nationalist draws comparisons to Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orban, who also rose to power on reformist claims but later used nationalist rhetoric and policies to stay in power. Dodik and Orban have also increased their cooperation (Hungary Today, 2019).

INTERNATIONAL NARRATIVES ON RS/ MILORAD DODIK/ BOSNIAN-SERBS

International media tend to position Milorad Dodik as a tool of Russia. They do so for more reasons. On 9 September the Bosnia & Herzegovina Football federation announced their intention on travelling to St. Petersburg to play a friendly match against Russia (NFSBiH, 2022) and, as it often is in Bosnian politics, the head of the Bosnian Football federation is Milorad Dodik’s nephew, Vico Zeljkovic. Furthermore, Dodik has opened a Republika Srpska representative office in Moscow, as well as met with Vladimir Putin on numerous occasions (Karcic, 2022). Positive Russia rhetoric and actions that favour Russian officials have changed the prevalent narrative for the worse and an example of this prevalent narrative is best exemplified

in the following twitter post by @ivanastradner:



APPENDIX 1.8

BOSNIAK NARRATIVES ON RS/ MILORAD DODIK/ BOSNIAN-SERBS

Bosniak circles also position Milorad Dodik negatively. This negative narrative against the leaders of Republika Srpska does not only extend to the international community but also is a prevalent narrative especially between Bosniaks, which is exemplified by the following tweet by the assumed to be Bosniak @fuadidi:



APPENDIX 1.9

BOSNIAN-SERB NARRATIVES ON RS/ MILORAD DODIK/ BOSNIAN-SERBS

However, the narratives on the newly elected Republika Srpska president on entity level, Milorad Dodik, are hugely fragmented and it is

important to put forward that the prevailing discourse on Milorad Dodik by Bosnian Serbs is more positive. Dodik has been receiving most of the attention of the media in both the national and international community. However, the newly elected Republika Srpska president on state level, Željka Cvijanović, also has diverse narratives from the different ethnic groups. The chosen Republika Srpska president was predominantly backed by the online community from Bosnian-Serbs as exemplified by @TomasDarko:



APPENDIX 1.57

Saying: "Željka Cvijanović is a symbol of political and every other honesty and correctness! Behind it remain and will remain roads, schools, bridges, business zones, new jobs, ... Zeljka's works are visible, they are symbols of her political activity and cannot be denied by anyone, just as there is no denying that the SDS in Prnjavor bought the committees and thus rewrote the will of the citizens. But Dragan Mektic said it best about them and their business and intentions!"

NON BOSNIAN-SERB NARRATIVES ON ŽELJKA CVIJANOVIĆ

This being said, it is also clearly visible that the countering, negative, narrative is prevailing when it is not from the Bosnian-Serb perspective, which is exemplified by the two tweets of @KemalSBeganovic:



APPENDIX 1.56

Writing: "I don't know where they're going, what they will do: Milanovic, Vucic, Dragan Covic and Borjana Krishto, Dodik and Zeljka Cvijanovic, when the Putin people flee Ukraine for their lives? What are these people going to do with themselves?"

And of @georgiokon:



APPENDIX 1.56

The newly elected Bosnian-Serb president, Željka Cvijanović, has diverse narratives from the different ethnic groups. She is predominantly backed by the online community from Bosnian-Serbs

Narratives on Bosnian-Croats

Bosnian-Croats, one of the constituent peoples of Bosnia & Herzegovina, seemed to receive less attention than Bosnian-Serbs. Much of the attention paid to this ethnic group in terms of online discourse revolved around the potential electoral law changes to be implemented by the OHR, changes which are supported by the HDZ.

ANTI HDZ NATIONALIST NARRATIVES

Much of that was antagonistic, with Twitter users such as @LegacyMarshalls calling the electoral law changes “fascist” in reply to a tweet from Dragan Čović, the Deputy Speaker of the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia & Herzegovina from the HDZ, where @LegacyMarshalls replies to @Dragan_Čović here:



APPENDIX 1.6

Another Twitter user, @kukurikukuu, criticised the manner in which it would give ethnic Bosnian-Croats outsized representation relative to their share of the population in response to a tweet from Zoltan Kovacs, a spokesman for Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán, in which he stated, “The challenge with Bosnia is how to integrate a country with 2 million muslims.” @kukurikukuu quote-tweets @zoltanspox here:




In a way that you will support Dodik to put pressure on Bosnians, and at the same time support the "HDZ election law" so that Bosnian Croats can get control over "muslims" and squeeze them in 1/3 although "muslims" are currently 55%+ of the Bosnian population. You motherfucker!

APPENDIX 1.7

MODERATE AND ACADEMIC SUPPORT TO HDZ-SUPPORTED ELECTORAL REFORM

Other observers on the political situation in the region take a more positive approach, emphasising the role that the Dayton Agreement has in protecting Bosnian-Croat interests. @MartaVrbetic, a Global Fellow at the Wilson Center, compares media coverage on a story about “[...] a scandal over an interview with an ex-con enjoying raping women[...]”, claiming this is why, “[...] Croats must insist on Dayton: they is no future for Croat identity in the Bosniak-run "civic" [Bosnia & Herzegovina]” here:



APPENDIX 1.50

Although this tweet is not explicitly about the election law, it does reinforce the attitude behind strengthening Bosnian-Croat representation, as Vrbetic herself has written about elsewhere (Vrbetic, 2022). Though the nature of the opinions on the Bosnian-Croats diverged significantly, during the run-up to the election there were much more strongly associated with the electoral law changes and the governing structure as implemented after Dayton than either of the other two.

The attention paid to this ethnic group revolved around the electoral law changes

Narratives on Bosniaks

The narratives on Bosniaks, one of the three constituent peoples of Bosnia & Herzegovina, centred around exacerbating divisions that came to bear during the war in the 1990s, or reflecting upon them. Much of the discussion detected in this report seemed to focus on the relationship between the Bosniak and Bosnian-Serb ethnic groups, with little emphasis on the role of Bosnian-Croats.

The narratives on Bosniaks centred around exacerbating divisions that came to bear during the war in the 1990s

ANTI-BOSNIAK SENTIMENT AMONG BOSNIAN-SERBS

A question posed by reddit user u/urnamm-u in the forum r/AskBalkans “Milorad Dodik (Bosnian president) claims that Christians and Muslims cannot exist in harmony. Do you agree?” (Appendix 1, 22). Although the (albeit non-representative) answer was “no” with a factor of more than 3-1, the fact that this subject was a matter of inquiry is significant, as it reveals the exposed cleavages in Bosnian society that have not healed.

Twitter user @fuadidi expresses his view that certain actors are capitalizing on these divisions with shamelessness, claiming that the rhetoric of Dodik is a step on the road to a repeated genocide against Muslim

Bosniaks (Appendix 1, 9). Another angle on this ethnic tension is the erasing of the other’s historical claims. Journalist and director of BH Radio @PejkaMedic seemed to echo the nationalist Bosnian-Serb sentiment when she tweeted an article exploring Bosnian and Serbian identity with the commentary, “Medieval Bosnia is a de jure Serbian state. King Tvrtko is a Serbian king. Lilies are a Christian symbol. Is this hard to remember?” (Appendix 1, 14). While this sort of rhetoric paints Bosniaks as eternal victims, others argue that they are not as blameless as they would appear.

One tweet by @HercegovkaKlo points to the fact that the SDA, a Bosniak nationalist conservative party, featured religious extremist Nezim Halilović Muder in their election promotional material. Here @HercegovkaKlo quote-tweets himself:



APPENDIX 1.32

Generally speaking, there is often used either strong positive or negative rhetoric when ethnic tensions involving Bosniaks is discussed, leaving little room for productive discussion.

Narratives on feelings of hopelessness

Bosnia & Herzegovina has for many years now faced both economic and political stagnation and hopelessness is on the rise. Therefore, the concept of brain drain is becoming a serious concern in the country. Approximately around 50-55.000 people leave Bosnia every year, many of those are young, skilled professionals seeking a brighter future for themselves (Sito-Sucic, 2021). This hopelessness stems from the political differences that have caused the country to stagnate, have high unemployment rates, poor public services and persistent corruption. The current status quo is something that all entities can agree on, it doesn't work for any of the respective entities. Therefore, this might be one rare instance where the three entities and the people of those can agree. However, the expectations for the politicians to enact change is not high, making the feeling of hopelessness amongst people grow. An example of that is @AgentTajneSile1's post on Twitter:



APPENDIX 1.30

This being said, the solutions to the problems of Bosnia & Herzegovina are highly politicised and disputed, resulting in potential policies favourable towards one entity, leaving the country without much room for progress and prosperity. The attitude of hopelessness is greatly reflected in the tweet by @srms_01:



APPENDIX 1.28


The war in Bosnia & Herzegovina was less than 30 years ago, it is still fresh in the memory of many of the people living within Bosnia and many have lost friends and relatives which has created large amounts of fear, depression, PTSD and anxiety within the country. Therefore, nationalist parties have been able to promote the status quo as not ideal but at least it wasn't war. The psychological part of why many are reluctant to push for change is not to be underestimated, many are not happy with the current status quo but fear that further expressing their displeasure might ultimately create civil unrest.

Narratives on the election

The 2022 general election is of course a major topic and is omnipresent in Bosnia & Herzegovina society. This being said, the social media posts concerning the election are not positive. General for all posts collected and concerning this topic are that the author

is deeply unsatisfied, or, at least based on rhetoric, seem to be so. Whether it concerns a specific party, a specific politician, the OHR, the influence from outside, the political system, or something else connected to the election, the dissatisfaction is clearly visible.

A general theme seems to be that no parties nor politicians keep their promises. An example of this, is the following Twitter post by @JasminMulahusic:



APPENDIX 1.11

Saying “Do people believe Gavrin’s promise? (Possibly Gavriilo Grahovac, politician) Those who believe him, are in big trouble. #election2022 #narodipravda #fromtheground #thatsforsure” and on the poster: “Narod I Pravda (political party, People and justice) - As soon as you vote for me, I will become a vegetarian. I promise.” This can be interpreted as a comment on how politicians often say absurd things to gain followers or voters. It’s a comment, possibly directed towards Gavriilo Grahovac, on how people from this party tell obvious lies and those who listen to them should be careful. The politicians act out of self-interest and could not care less about the country.

The question about possible election fraud is also to be found amongst the posts.

Getting more than 660 liked, 160 retweets and 40 comments, the US-based Ivana Stradner (@ivanastradner) wrote the following on Twitter: “Today Putin had a meeting with his proxy Milorad Dodik (Bosnian Serb, a genocide-denying secessionist) and I have no doubt Putin gave him some useful tips for elections in Bosnia that will take place in October.” indication that Milorad Dodik in Republika Srpska is just as corrupt as Vladimir Putin:



APPENDIX 1.18

This leads to hopelessness - nothing can be done anyway and the election does not really matter, nothing can improve the country. As an example, @srms_01, a Bosnian mechanical engineering student living in Sarajevo, expresses, in the Twitter-reply above (appendix 1, 28), how she feels alienated from Bosnian domestic politics, writing: “We have elections on Sunday here in Bosnia. It will be much more of a mess. All three constitutive nations will vote for their respective right-wing parties, that literally do nothing to improve our country. All three of them. So, I can feel your pain.”

There is a certain meaninglessness and anger connected with the election, and calling different people war criminals is not unusual - the war and collective trauma is present even on social media. A reddit user in the following post comments on the ineffectiveness of the US sanctions on HDZ and SNSD, based on Milorad Dodik, Marinko Čavara,

Željka Cvijanović, Alen Šeranić and Mirsad Kukić being among the candidates for the election. The user writes: "American sanctions and blacklists mean nothing to HDZ and SNSD: Milorad Dodik, Marinko Čavara, Željka Cvijanović, Alen Šeranić and Mirsad Kukić are among the candidates for the elections."

Posted by u[[deleted]] 3 months ago
3 HDZ-u i SNSD-u američke sankcije i crne liste ne znače ništa:
Među kandidatima za izbore su Milorad Dodik, Marinko Čavara, Željka Cvijanović, Alen Šeranić i Mirsad Kukić

APPENDIX 1.44

People do not believe that the election will change anything for the better.

It stresses a big problem in society; the past is still present and the anger and disappointment, especially in politics, has not gone away - people do not believe that the election will change anything for the better.

Narratives on OHR

Much of the narrative surrounding the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in the run-up to the election on 3 October involved speculation on the potential changes to the electoral law, which were eventually implemented on the day of the election itself by the High Representative, Christian Schmidt. The red thread throughout much of the discussion on this topic involved the role of external parties in the Bosnian political environment through the OHR.

OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE & ELECTION LAW

Twitter user @nedadmemic, raised in Sarajevo and now living in Vienna, emphasises the outsized influence that EU member states have over the office and how the actions of the office holder often seem to reflect an arrogant positioning. In this tweet, he echoes a sentiment put forward by Michael Martens, a journalist for the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on his impressions about Christian Schmidt following an interview with him in September, namely that there is an impression seemingly shared by many in Bosnia & Herzegovina that Schmidt will not succeed in

implementing his vision of the electoral law changes and that his tenure will largely prove to be a failure.



APPENDIX 1.35

At another point, @nedadmemic also tweets about the involvement of the Croatian government in negotiating the amendments to the electoral law - pointing out the audacity of a foreign government so blatantly involving itself in the domestic affairs of a neighbour, arguing that elsewhere on the continent, this would not stand.



APPENDIX 1.51


@IsmailCidic, the president of the Bosnian Advocacy Center, had a similar response to the admission from the Croatian government, but went further, declaring that Schmidt ought to resign.



APPENDIX 1.38

OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE & ETHNIC TENSIONS

Others focused less on the role of the international community in impacting election law, instead focusing on the relationship between the Office of the High Representative and the existing ethnic tensions in Bosnia & Herzegovina. The Director of the Srebrenica Memorial Center, @suljagicemir1, blasted Schmidt saying "The kind of racism white European Christian men get away with when discussing Bosnia and it's (sic) Bosniaks/Muslims is simply unbelievable" in reference to his statement referring to Bosniaks self-identifying as Croats and "outvoting" them for the Croat seat of the tripartite presidency.



APPENDIX 1.49

This sort of commentary on the interplay between the Office of the High Representative and ethnicity drove more engagement than more aggressive tweets criticising whole swathes of people for their ethnicity - such as when @JStjepandic pointed out what he saw as the hypocrisy of Bosniaks - generally speaking - in response to the proposed changes of the election law. An example of this can be seen in the following post, where @JStjepandic quote-tweets @adicerimagic, Senior Analyst at the The European Stability Initiative:



APPENDIX 1.53

A unique balance between the two was the use of the OHR, or of Schmidt himself, as a political symbol for a pro-Western orientation, as @diplomatijsa did when he tweeted a photo of Jelena Trivić, a critic of Milorad Dodik and a candidate for president of Republika Srpska for the PDP and the SDS, standing next to Schmidt - juxtaposed with a photo of Dodik shaking hands with Vladimir Putin. The tweet is captioned, "The choice has never been easier!" (Appendix 1, 20). Based on the post history of the user, it is clear that this is an endorsement of Dodik and a pro-Russian agenda. Fundamentally, the narrative on the Office of the High Representative centres around the changes to the electoral law and on the outsized and arguably undemocratic role that Schmidt has in Bosnian politics.

Narratives on the International Community

Since the signing of the Dayton Agreement in December 1995, the international community has played a significant role in the region, and its presence was certainly felt during the run-up to the election. Much of the discussion regarding the direct involvement of the international community in Bosnia & Herzegovina revolves around the role of the Office of the High Representative (see previous section). Nevertheless, there is indeed a broader view of the narrative of the international community in rhetoric surrounding the election. The dominant narrative seemed to suggest that the election was a choice between a closer alignment with the West and a pathway to EU integration and NATO membership on one hand and a further ethnic splintering with a Russian-aligned Republika Srpska on the other. A secondary, but equally important narrative, seemed to suggest that Bosnia is simply a pawn in a game between major world powers, a sentiment that seems to echo the general feelings of hopelessness among Bosnians (see sections above).

WESTERN ALIGNMENT VS. ETHNIC SPLINTERING

Despite not receiving a tremendous amount of engagement, @strategistpin's tweet featuring a photo of newly-elected Giorgia Meloni sitting across the table from Milorad Dodik with a map of Bosnia & Herzegovina in the background is perhaps one of the more striking examples of the first narrative. "Bosnia is Europe's litmus paper for fascism. If you wanna know if someone's a fascist, just ask them what they think about independent, egalitarian Bosnia & Herzegovina. [...]" reads the tweet (Appendix 1, 31). The @KubaBielamowicz, a Polish analyst of Central, Southeast Europe, and the Western Balkans at the Institute of New Europe offered a more sober tone on this

same divide - highlighting Milorad Dodik's anti-Western rhetoric prior to his meeting with Vladimir Putin in September (Appendix 1, 17).

BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE - MEDDLING IN THE REGION FROM BOTH THE WEST AND RUSSIA

While there is significant criticism directed toward the more illiberal elements opposing a more Western orientation, there is also disappointment and frustration aimed at both European and Bosnian politicians toward the lack of progress toward accession to the European Union. A Senior Analyst at the The European Stability Initiative, @adicerimagic tweets about this, highlighting the conditionality that the EU applied to Bosnia's potential candidate status (Appendix 1, 12). The secondary narrative centres around what appears to be a cynical approach to the place of Bosnia & Herzegovina on the world stage. An example of this can be seen in a reply to a tweet by Jasmin Mujanović, in which he states that both Dodik and the Democratic Front, a Montenegrin right-wing political coalition, are being bankrolled by the Russian state. @VonFischer2 claims that the international community (as represented by US, UK, and EU flag emojis) has long known this fact and allowed it to continue, while using the political situations in Bosnia & Herzegovina and Montenegro to ostensibly further their own agendas in the region:



APPENDIX 1.2

These two narratives - one about a choice between democracy and integration or

or illiberalism and division and a second about being buffered between outside forces - seem to share the same core message: a sense that a deep division exists in Bosnian politics and a distrust in the international community to help reconcile it.

Narratives on Russian influence

Russian influence has been well documented in Eastern Europe and in the Balkans. Vladimir Putin has on numerous occasions met with both the Serbian President, Aleskander Vucic and the now President of Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik.

RUSSIA AS A DESTABILISING FORCE - A BOSNIAN PERSPECTIVE

Russia and the Russian invasion of Ukraine has further created a “us vs them narrative”, with the western society and EU on one side, while Russia and their supporters stand on the opposing side. This has definitely had a trickle down effect and further created tensions in Bosnia & Herzegovina which has fueled an “us vs them narrative”.

The prevailing discourse and narrative of the Bosniaks has been that Russia’s intention is to destabilise the region and to be supportive of Milorad Dodik’s secessionist ideas. The prevailing narrative between Bosniaks and the international western society has been negative towards Russia and Russian influence, which is exemplified by @JakubJanda:



Jakub Janda 楊雅樂
@_JakubJanda

Expect Russia and its puppet Hungary to destabilise Bosnia via its proxies like Serbian extremist Dodik.

7:06 PM · 19. mar. 2022 · Twitter Web App

77 Retweets 5 Citat-Tweets 313 Likes

APPENDIX 1.58

Furthermore, the negative narratives of the international community likely contributed to the UK introducing sanctions against Dodik

because of his affiliation with Putin and secessionist rhetoric. The US later also enhanced their sanctions towards Dodik, on 3 October, for similar reasons (Blinken, 2022).

RUSSIA AS A CULTURAL BROTHER - A BOSNIAN-SERB PERSPECTIVE




Marko Mihaljević (Кена-1389) 🇷🇺🇷🇸🇷🇪
@markokena

ЦРНА ГОРА ЈЕ СРБИЈА - РЕПУБЛИКА СРБСКА ЈЕ СРБИЈА - МАКЕДОНИЈА ЈЕ СРБИЈА - КРАЈИНА ЈЕ СРБИЈА ❤️ БОСНА И ХЕРЦЕГОВИНА ЈЕ СРБИЈА - УКРАЈИНА ЈЕ РУСИЈА, КОСОВО ЈЕ СРБИЈА. 🇷🇺🇷🇸🇷🇪

ЖИВЕЛА БРАТСКА РУСИЈА 🇷🇺❤️ ЖИВЕЛА МАЈКА СРБИЈА. ❤️ 🇷🇺

Oversæt Tweet



APPENDIX 1.59

On the other side of the “us vs them narrative” stands many Bosnian-Serbs who welcome Russian influence and point out the historical ties that Russia has to the region. Bosnian-Serbs and Russians share a strong religious connection as both are predominantly Eastern Orthodox and find a cultural common ground. There is growing bilateral relations and economic relations between Republika Srpska and Russia, but the Republika Srpska part is still heavily reliant on EU trade and Russia’s economic leverage over Bosnia is still relatively limited, as exports from Republika Srpska to Russia is well below 1% and well below 2% for imports (Ruge, 2022).

Furthermore, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is also only 4 percent from Russia in Bosnia as a whole. This is often not publicised and the discourse of Russian dependence is often the prevailing discourse between the Bosnian-Serbs. Therefore, Bosnian-Serbs as well as Serbian nationals have had a more positive tone towards of Russia, often regarding them as brothers, as exemplified by @markokena above (Appendix 1.59), saying: “Montenegro is Serbia - Republika Srpska is Serbia - Macedonia is Serbia - the end of Serbia ♥ is Bosnia and Herzegovina - Ukraine is Russia, Kosovo is Serbia † † † ☠ Long live brother Russia ♥ , long live mother Serbia. ♥ .”

Other

Along with the above analysed topics many others are present on social media concerning Bosnia & Herzegovina. General for many of the posts are the hostile rhetoric and in some cases, direct threats. An example of this can be seen in the Twitter post by @LegacyMarshalls:



APPENDIX 1.6

This tone is also used against women. Generally it is known that “Bosnian women in politics face little or no protection against gender-based abuse online” (Salkanovic, 2022) and the surprisingly few posts about women collected by the STOs support this. An example is a reply to a tweet by the director of BH Radio Pejka Medic where @vedranrodic writes: “Is that Pejka found retarded in the hallway again, unable to find the office?”



APPENDIX 1.15

There is no physical threat in the post, but she is called “retarded” and “unable to find the office”. These types of phrases are unlikely to be used for male’s in power. On the authors page other tweets can be found which are not sympathetic towards women, for example “Finally, with some consulting, I learned the name of the female version of the unpopular mansplaining. Ringing 🤖”.

As well as aggression towards women, it is generally known that there is a lot of dis- and misinformation on social media concerning bosnian politics. This has been hard to detect directly in the posts collected for this report, but an interesting example on how the label “fake news” is being used to actually share fake news is the following reply on Twitter by @HrvPor982:



APPENDIX 1.3

It might be a hostile state actor troll account or hurtful individual who is pushing an assessed disingenuous disinfo/misinfo narrative that Bosniak Muslims claim genocide denial for "unitarist Islamist goals". Genocide is often the topic when it comes to dis- and misinformation which can have something to do with how the common history in Bosnia & Herzegovina is told amongst the different groups. An example could be the following answer on Twitter by @Croatorum925Rex:



APPENDIX 1.5

Finally an example has been collected concerning the environment. It is a topic that takes up great space in politics in many other countries, but not as much

in Bosnia & Herzegovina. Here @IgorTomi1 states that people are angry at the excessive use of money on lesser important things, when other aspects (such as environment) should be prioritised and dealt with in unity:



APPENDIX 1.10

Writing: "Does a "Razzie" for bad politicians exist? For all these thickheads on the posters, regardless of which party. How much money haven't you spent on campaigns, better if we all together cleaned the earth (Country) of trash, in an action of joint effort. #election2022 #bh2022#bh."

There is no physical threat but these types of phrases are unlikely to be used for male's in power.

Conclusion and recommendations

Looking at the sixty social media posts from different (though primarily Twitter) platforms, it becomes clear that the Bosnian political environment, if not fully, then to some extent, is reflected in the social media landscape. The domestic focus is striking and the posts tend to be extreme and aggressive, and generally there is a hostile online behaviour - often the answers are more antagonistic than the original posts. Many posts are negative and destructive, filled with hate and focusing on what does not work and what the author doesn't like. There is not much hope for the Bosnian future to be found online. There's a strong sense of 'us vs them' in most posts; setting two persons, groups or likewise up against each other. Specific politicians and also specific ethnic groups are often the centre of attention, either being called names, victimised or villainized.

The fact that it is always a quite black and white view leaves very little room for productive discussion.

Though this report with its sixty posts does not depict the general media picture surrounding Bosnia & Herzegovina, it does support the thesis that the social media landscape of Bosnia & Herzegovina reflects the political landscape. It makes it visible that towards the election were cases of polarization, extreme and aggressive rhetoric and dis- and misinformation was commonplace.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- Online initiatives such as the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue's Bosnia and Herzegovina's Social Media charter should be promoted and funded to facilitate safer and calmer spaces online
- International organisations with credibility and expertise, such as the OSCE, should develop training packages for media and social media literacy
- The OHR should continue fact checking and debunking disinformation
- Embassies such as the British and US embassies should also offer support to combatting dis and misinformation online, and the EU should establish a greater online presence which counters these challenges
- Social media outlets should continue their work into closing down troll farms and bot accounts

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Appendix 1

Post 1.1 // 2 OCT 2022 // @JasminMuj // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/JasminMuj/status/1576628028494344192>



Post 1.2 // 14 SEP 2022 // @VonFischer2 // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/JasminMuj/status/1570089233750298624> (full thread in which @VonFischer2 replies to Mujanović)



Post 1.3 // 14 SEP 2022 // @HrvPor982 // Twitter

Hyperlink:

<https://twitter.com/HrvPor982/status/1570056597258264577?s=20&t=A6isOUYtNj59gTOZiHytRQ>



Post 1.4 // 10 SEP 2022 // @Termina31872579 // Twitter

Hyperlink: https://twitter.com/Termina31872579/with_replies



Post 1.5 // 14 SEP 2022 // @Croatorum925Rex // Twitter

Hyperlink: *Does no longer exist*



Post 1.6 // 10 AUG 2022 // @LegacyMarshalls // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/LegacyMarshalls/status/1557357492262273025>



Legacy II @LegacyMarshalls

Svarer @Dragan_Covic og @JulianReillyUK

Stick your fascist election law changes to your criminal ass! No apartheid in Bosnia because of you, otherwise you see people on the streets again. Clear?

Oversæt Tweet

3.25 PM · 10. aug. 2022 · Twitter Web App

Post 1.7 // 21 DEC 2021 // @Kukurikukuu // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/Kukurikukuu/status/1473346274808246288>



kukurikukuu @Kukurikukuu

In a way that you will support Dodik to put pressure on Bosnians, and at the same time support the "HDZ election law" so that Bosnian Croats can get control over "muslims" and squeeze them in 1/3 although "muslims" are currently 55%+ of the Bosnian population. You motherfucker!

Oversæt Tweet

Zoltan Kovacs @zoltanspox · 21. dec. 2021

The challenge with Bosnia is how to integrate a country with 2 million muslims.

[Vis denne tråd](#)

Post 1.8 // 14 SEP 2022 // @ivanastradner // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/ivanastradner>



Ivana Stradner @ivanastradner · 14 Sep

Russian proxy, Bosnian Serb, Milorad **Dodik** openly says they actually do surveillance on US Ambassador. They still operate within KGB cheap gaslighting intel tactics...Serbs are like Russians - emotional, sensitive and self-sabotaging and they will actually destroy themselves.

Post 1.9 // 14 SEP 2022 // @fuadidi // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/fuadidi>



F Đidić @fuadidi · 14 Sep

Campaign to exterminate #Muslims of #BiH starts with words of this man. No longer constrained by any pretense of respecting peace process & HR #Dodik openly inflame slow motion #genocide. Racism & apartheid is a state policy. #RS



api.politicki.ba
Dodik: Nemoгуć suživot hrišćana i muslimana

Post 1.10 // 17 SEP 2022 // @IgorTomi1 // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/IgorTomi1/status/1570928818835296256?cxt=HHwWgMDQ4YDch80rAAA>



Postoji li zlatna malina za loše političare? Za ove sve glavonje na plakatima, bilo koje stranke. Koliko ste samo novca potrošili na kampanje, bolje da smo svi zajedno ocistili zemlju (drzavu) od smeća, sa zajednickim radnim akcijama. #izbori2022 #bih2022 #bih

Post 1.11 // 14 SEP 2022 // @JasminMulahusic // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/JasminMulahusic/status/1569916712924971009>



Vjerujete li narode u Gavrina obećanja? Ko mu vjeruje, u ozbiljnom je problemu 🙄

#izbori2022 #narodipravda #iztemelja #sigurno



Post 1.12 // 17 SEP 2022 // @adicerimagic // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/adicerimagic/status/1571057884313849856>




#BiH should have become #EU candidate in 2010 - with 🇩🇪 - but it has not. Why? Unlike others in Balkans, 🇸🇮 politicians listened to advice not to apply for EU membership. Since then 🇩🇪 pushed a deeply unfair conditionality that left everyone in 🇸🇮 🇮🇹 frustrated. Time to correct it!

Overseas Tweet



Post 1.13 // 12 SEP 2022 // @JasminMulahusic // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/JasminMulahusic/status/1569315147528785922?cxt=HHwWhMC-OfzzqccrAAAA>



Post 1.14 // 7 SEP 2022 // @PejkaMedic // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/PejkaMedic/status/1567502112732364801?s=20&t=cvNjYAH2tSUqYIs1JSikxA>



Средњевјековна Босна је де јуре српска држава.
Краљ Твртко је српски краљ.
Љиљани су хришћански симбол.
Је ли ово тешко запамтити?

[Oversæt Tweet](#)



sarajevonavezi.com

Чији су наши љиљани?

Пише: Давор Џицовић Нацтрам ономад заставу с љиљанима на табли и питам дјецу: "Колико вас би обукло мајцу с оваквим детаљима?" Неко? Ник...

3:16 PM · 7. sep. 2022 · Twitter for Android

63 Retweets 42 Citat-Tweets 666 Likes

Post 1.15 // 9 SEP 2022 // @vedranrodic // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/vedranrodic/status/1568145898974154752?s=20&t=OTAL2XKOheiz2grqDnruHg>




Svarer @PejkaMedic

Jel to opet Pejka nađena retardirana na hodniku kako ne zna potrefit kancelariju?

9:54 AM · 9. sep. 2022 · Twitter Web App

Post 1.16 // 9 SEP 2022 // @BrgEdis // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/BrgEdis/status/1568129971901665282?s=20&t=OTAL2XKOheiz2grqDnruHg>

 **Haile Selasije**
@BrgEdis

Svarer @PejkaMedic

Ko ti dade to moderno ime čuj Pejka. Iz koje si pripizdine?! Jel prošao optički kabal, kako se snalazis da pristupis internetu? Ponasaj se u skladu vijeka u kojem živiš!

Post 1.17 // 19 SEP 2022 // @KubaBielamowicz // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/KubaBielamowicz/status/1571868592639033344?s=20&t=pQn4PRKjDjYJGXU-TlFqQ>

 **Jakub Bielamowicz**
@KubaBielamowicz

#BiH 🇧🇦: Bosnian Serbs leader & BiH Presidency member @MiloradDodik prepares the ground for his meeting tomorrow with Putin by slamming the West, justifying 🇷🇺's invasion on 🇺🇦 and repeating his usual anti-Muslim slur.

On Oct 2, 🇧🇦 will hold an election.

[Oversæt Tweet](#)



jutarnji.hr
'Invazija Rusije je opravdana. Slično je i kod nas, s muslimanima ne možemo dij...

4.27 PM · 19. sep. 2022 · Twitter for iPhone

30 Retweets 2 Citat-Tweets 119 Likes

Post 1.18 // 20 SEP 2022 // @ivanastradner // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/ivanastradner/status/1572300395728470017?s=20&t=pQn4PRKjDjYJGXU-TlFqQ>

 **Ivana Stradner** 🇺🇦
@ivanastradner

Today Putin had a meeting with his proxy Milorad Dodik (Bosnian Serb, a genocide-denying secessionist) and I have no doubt Putin gave him some useful tips for elections in Bosnia that will take place in October.

[Oversæt Tweet](#)



0:02 88,3 t visninger

Fra **Милорад Додик**

9.03 PM · 20. sep. 2022 · Twitter for iPhone

163 Retweets 21 Citat-Tweets 659 Likes

Post 1.19 // 14 SEP 2022 // @herzog96 // Twitter

Hyperlink: [account no longer exists](#)



Belisarius
@herzog96

Cvetković - Maček 1939.
Pavelić - Stojadinović 1954.
Tuđman - Milošević 1992.
Milanović - Dodik 2022.

Nisu uspjeli rasparčati Bosnu i Hercegovinu u mnogo - za nas - težim historijskim momentima. Neće im poći za rukom ni danas. Završit će na smetljištu historije.

7:37 p.m. · 14 sep. 2022 · Twitter for Android

7 Retweets 2 Geciteerde Tweets 28 Vind-ik-leuks

Post 1.20 // 14 SEP 2022 // @diplomatijsRS // Twitter

Hyperlink: [post no longer exists](#)



Radoje
@diplomatijsRS

Избор никада није био лакши!

[Tweet vertalen](#)



7:48 p.m. · 17 sep. 2022 · Twitter for Android

8 Retweets 1 Citeer Tweet 37 Vind-ik-leuks

Post 1.21 // 15 SEP 2022 // @diplomatijsRS // Twitter

Hyperlink: https://twitter.com/diplomatijsRS/status/1570459753209536513?s=20&t=ZARA1bxQAFrLO_wOXm7D5A



Radoje
@diplomatijsRS

Nema Brane, nema Tita, Trivić sluša samo Šmita

Šmit je dao obećanje
da će Jela da postane
Sve što budu htjeli stranci,
a ne Srbi pravoslavci

Sve kriminal i korupcija -
obavezna joj lekcija,
da narodu sve ogadi
i Srpsku nam razgradi. (1)



7:09 PM · 15. sep. 2022 · Twitter for Android

42 Retweets 68 Citat-Tweets 128 Likes

Post 1.22 // 15 SEP 2022 // AskBalkans // Reddit

Hyperlink: https://www.reddit.com/r/AskBalkans/comments/xewhao/milorad_dodik_bosnian_president_claims_that/

Posted by u/ur-nammu **Bosnia & Herzegovina** 1 month ago

77 **Milorad Dodik (Bosnian president) claims that Christians and Muslims cannot exist in harmony. Do you agree?**

Politics/Governance

<https://ba.n1info.com/english/news/dodik-bih-is-an-example-of-how-christian-and-muslim-communities-cannot-coexist/>

Interested to see this sub's opinion on the matter.

2.4k votes

549	Yes
1.8k	No

Voting closed 1 month ago

187 Comments Share Save Hide Report 100% Upvoted

Post 1.23 // 24 JUL 2022 // AskARussian // Reddit

Hyperlink: https://www.reddit.com/r/AskARussian/comments/wf5bjq/what_do_you_think_about_republika_srpska/

Posted by u/Srbin_004 3 months ago



24 **What do you think about Republika Srpska?**

Politics

83 Comments Share Save Hide Report 85% Upvoted


Post 1.24 // 24 JUL 2022 // r2dsf // Reddit



Hyperlink: https://www.reddit.com/r/AskARussian/comments/wf5bjj/what_do_you_think_about_republika_srpska/

 r2dsf · 2 mdr. siden
 Moscow Oblast
Срби и Руси Браћа Заувек
↑ 7 ↓ Reply Give Award Share Report Save Follow

Post 1.25 // 24 JUL 2022 // madmapguy // Reddit



Hyperlink: https://www.reddit.com/r/AskARussian/comments/wf5bjj/what_do_you_think_about_republika_srpska/

 madmapguy · 2 mdr. siden
Panteri panteri...
↑ 3 ↓ Reply Give Award Share Report Save Follow

 _user4me_ · 2 mdr. siden
 Serbia
Дошло вријеме да се Срби свете...
↑ 2 ↓ Reply Give Award Share Report Save Follow

Post 1.26 // 24 JUL 2022 // madmapguy // Reddit

Hyperlink: https://www.reddit.com/r/AskARussian/comments/wf5bjj/what_do_you_think_about_republika_srpska/

 KaiserWilhelmII_ · 2 mdr. siden
 Samara
Republika Srpska must be Serbian
↑ 3 ↓ Reply Give Award Share Report Save Follow


Post 1.27 // 26 AUG 2022 // @survivor_rights // Twitter

Hyperlink: https://twitter.com/survivor_rights

 Nerina Čevra @survivor_rights · 26. Aug. ...
One of the reasons the big three #nationalist ruling parties in #BiH do not talk about plans post-#election is that they will do different thing depending on whether they win another 4 years of no fear of jail or loss of illegally obtained benefits and privileges.


Post 1.28 // 26 SEP 2022 // @srms_01 // Twitter

Hyperlink: https://twitter.com/srms_01/status/1574341059576209408

 SaraMS @srms_01 ...
Svarer @allthatglitz
We have elections on Sunday here in Bosnia. It will be much more of a mess. All three constitutive nations will vote for their respective right-wing parties, that literally do nothing to improve our country. All three of them. So, I can feel your pain.

Post 1.29 // 21 SEP 2022 // @TheBosniakGOAT // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/TheBosniakGOAT/status/1572356720139309057>

 Ervin @TheBosniakGOAT ...
Nothing makes me angrier than opportunistic politicians in Bosnia who will take shots at other pro-Bosnia politicians for cheap election points.
You are as destructive to Bosnia as the criminals Covic and Dodik.

Post 1.30 // 17 SEP 2022 // @AgentTajneSile1 // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/AgentTajneSile1/status/1571249915396853760>



Anel
@AgentTajneSile1

Svarer @antaldaniel @United_Bosnia og @OHR_BiH

BiH politicians don't campaign and hope for election in order to enact change. It's an income and a way of life; no want for social/national betterment.

Post 1.31 // 26 SEP 2022 // @StrategistPin // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/StrategistPin/status/1574472894792568842>



Mr. Gold 🇺🇸 🇧🇪
@StrategistPin

Bosnia is Europe's litmus paper for fascism. If you wanna know if someone's a fascist, just ask them what they think about independent, egalitarian Bosnia and Herzegovina. Meloni with Orban pondering over Bosnia's ethnic map behind them.

Oversæt Tweet



Post 1.32 // 26 SEP 2022 // @HercegovkaKlo // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/HercegovkaKlo/status/1574296449893941248>



hercegovka klo @HercegovkaKlo · 26. sep.

Ponovo pitam ... zašto je #SDA dozvoljeno imati izbornu kampanju s #Muderris kao centralnom figurom... imamom, zapovjednikom 4. muslimanske koji je osumnjičen za ratne zločine nad Hrvatima i Srbima @BakalarZeljko maca pojela jezik?
@USEmbassySJJ @USEmbZagreb @OHR_BiH @OSCEBiH



hercegovka klo @HercegovkaKlo · 25. sep.

Svarer @BuljevicJosip

In the war he was appointed as a brigade commander who fought with the shouts of Tekbir against Croats and Serbs and committed war crimes
[youtube.com/watch?v=4Hexfk...](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Hexfk...)

7

5

18



hercegovka klo
@HercegovkaKlo

Glavna je ličnost na izbornom spotu #SDA i počasni gost na svim izbornim skupovima
@OHR_BiH @USEmbassySJJ @eubih @OSCEBiH
@BakalarZeljko sudjelujete u stvaranju Islamske države BIH?

@zorankresic @JureGudelj @MisetiLaw @hms_ba
@rtvhercegbosne @sutalo_tihomir @SeverMaja @coe

Post 1.33 // 27 SEP 2022 // @qossofficial // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/qossofficial/status/1574694816092258305>

Queen of Strong Style@ Alex Lee | Irena Jan... @qossoffi... · 27. sep. ...
Two political camps in Bosnia have produced a number of historical myths, all of which have proved useful to those Serbs and Croats seeking to tear Bosnia apart. These myths claim, that Bosnia is an artificial entity, made up of 3 ethnic groups – Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks.

Vis denne tråd

Queen of Strong Style@ Alex Lee | Irena Jan... @qossoffi... · 27. sep. ...
The truth is this: there is a Bosnia, there are the Bosnian people and there is a Bosnian identity. Have been for a 1000 years. Will be for a 1000 more.

Queen of Strong Style@ Alex Lee | Irena Jan... @qossoffi... · 27. sep. ...
In our fight to stay that which we, Bosnians have been for the last 1000 years, this is crucial: the truth is like a dragon, it doesn't need defending, it defends itself. The task for every Bosnian living is to speak our truth and defend our nation.

Post 1.34 // 26 SEP 2022 // @StateDeptSpox // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/StateDeptSpox/status/1574450079087398912>

Ned Price @StateDeptSpox
United States government official

Bosnia and Herzegovina's (BiH) future is under threat from those who undermine democracy and the rule of law. Today, @USTreasury designated state prosecutor Diana Kajmakovic for corruption and undermining BiH's democratic processes or institutions.

state.gov
Designation of a Person in Bosnia and Herzegovina for Corruption and Undermi...
The United States is designating Diana Kajmakovic, a state prosecutor in the Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) State Prosecutor's Office, for being responsible ...

7:25 PM · 26. sep. 2022 · Twitter Web App

38 Retweets 4 Citat-Tweets 182 Likes

Post 1.35 // n.d. // @NedadMemic // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/NedadMemic>

Nedad Memic @NedadMemic · 8 t ...
The Government of Croatia officially admitted they had negotiated "thoroughly and discretely" with the High Representative Schmidt about the amendments to the Electoral Law of **Bosnia-Herzegovina** "for months". In any other country in Europe, this would be a first-class scandal.

Vlada Republike Hr... @Vlad... · 21 t
S visokim predstavnikom Schmidtom smo razgovarali mjesecima temeljito i diskretno. Kada se u taj proces uključio predsjednik i izvrjeđao Schmidta, onda je vjerojatno malo i splasnulo njegov entuzijazam da ispravi nepravde prema Hrvatima u BiH. (1/2)

Vis denne tråd

2 29 74

Post 1.36 // 12 JUL 2022 // karmel80 // Instagram

Hyperlink: <https://www.instagram.com/p/Cf5-ZixsJV5/?igshid=YmMyMTA2M2Y%3D&fbclid=IwAR0mQOowZTyEL8HjEYcyijSsz137fn-xijCgTKahbHECFahdCrG5W8w2BXg>

karmel80 · Følg
Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina

karmel80 Meeting with our liberal party colleague Naša Stranka as well as speaking with local journalists about the European prospects for Bosnia-Herzegovina, which require a complete gear change amongst the politicians in power - and a change of the politicians in powers towards more liberal and progressive politics ensuring rule of law, reconciliation and tolerance of conviction

47 Synes godt om
JULI 12

Kommentarer til dette opslag er blevet begrænset.

Post 1.37 // 26 SEP 2022 // @HercegovkaKlo // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/hercegovkaklo/status/1574372450636374016?s=46&t=RXiBu1i7OWqvQfL4OfZoXQ&fbclid=IwAR01slq-tsxz7XKAro4FWE5Ua7YKgcQ60xW8veCo9h8mQzNaP5hTN3eD204>



Post 1.38 // 27 SEP 2022 // @IsmailCidic // Twitter

Hyperlink: https://twitter.com/ismailcidic/status/1574520895879593984?s=46&t=RXiBu1i7OWqvQfL4OfZoXQ&fbclid=IwAR3buVsXo9gbvUDptjEhF-1sQ81j_VDXiE0tIUzb-0URhXvfb-Sm4ukNqCQ
Full threat here: <https://twitter.com/IsmailCidic/status/1574520895879593984>



Post 1.39 // 23 SEP 2022 // Filip Foldrup // LinkedIn

Hyperlink: [https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:6975890737015971840/?updateEntityUrn=urn%3Ali%3Afs_feedUpdate%3A\(V2%2Curn%3Ali%3Aactivity%3A6975890737015971840\)&fbclid=IwAR0cnTNx3WkisP3AT6D5ta9nBRbz6YbCluRFpF5cRBoF1uRjI2Af1ojW14U](https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:6975890737015971840/?updateEntityUrn=urn%3Ali%3Afs_feedUpdate%3A(V2%2Curn%3Ali%3Aactivity%3A6975890737015971840)&fbclid=IwAR0cnTNx3WkisP3AT6D5ta9nBRbz6YbCluRFpF5cRBoF1uRjI2Af1ojW14U)



Post 1.40 // 23 SEP 2022 // Nusret Ozgul // LinkedIn

Hyperlink: [linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:6976890036092817409/](https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:6976890036092817409/)

updateEntityUrn=urn%3Ali%3Afs_feedUpdate%3A(V2%2Curn%3Ali%3Aactivity%3A6976890036092817409)&fbclid=IwAR23FezlcT1ypsj1W1HFAPw5296YqK2Y54TBEE8VFLli5vZVlPe_bVf5xQ



Post 1.41 // 27 SEP 2022 // .think atlantic // LinkedIn

Hyperlink: [linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:6976890036092817409/](https://www.linkedin.com/feed/update/urn:li:activity:6976890036092817409/)

updateEntityUrn=urn%3Ali%3Afs_feedUpdate%3A(V2%2Curn%3Ali%3Aactivity%3A6976890036092817409)&fbclid=IwAR23FezlcT1ypsj1W1HFAPw5296YqK2Y54TBEE8VFLli5vZVlPe_bVf5xQ



Post 1.42 // AUG 2022 // u/tamburasi // Reddit

Hyperlink: https://www.reddit.com/r/bih/comments/wvduhj/change_bosnias_election_plan_legislating/



Post 1.43 // APRIL 2022 // u/screwyoushadowban // Reddit

Hyperlink: https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/u2920r/genocide_denial_by_public_figures_is_mainstream/

Posted by u/screwyoushadowban **Interesting Inquirer** 6 months ago

4 Genocide denial by public figures is mainstream in contemporary Republika Srpska (sub-federation of Bosnia & Herzegovina). Was public political endorsement of genocide denial a thing in the late 90s/early 00s?

Was it not possible to "get away" with genocide denial in the 90s and early 00s given the proximity to the wars and the publicity around them or was genocide denial always a popular public talking point for politicians in post-Dayton Republika Srpska?

Thank you

1 Comment Share Save Hide Report 75% Upvoted

Post 1.44 // JULY 2022 // u/WuhanLabTechnician // Reddit

Hyperlink: https://www.reddit.com/r/bosnia/comments/whigy/hdzu_i_snsdu_ameri%C4%8Dke_sankcije_i_crne_liste_ne/

Posted by u/[deleted] 3 months ago

3 HDZ-u i SNSD-u američke sankcije i crne liste ne znače ništa: Među kandidatima za izbore su Milorad Dodik, Marinko Čavara, Željka Cvijanović, Alen Šeranić i Mirsad Kukić

Post 1.45 // 29 SEP 2022 // @SwabianGenocide // Twitter

Hyperlink: https://twitter.com/SwabianGenocide/with_replies (has since been deleted)

Edin Mujkic @edin_mujkic · Sep 27

Apparently one of the problems for Italy is, Josip Broz Tito. Tito died in 1980. He managed to really piss Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin. But, apparently even in afterlife, he is pissing off fascist.

2 4

SwabianGenocide @SwabianGenocide

Replying to @edin_mujkic

Also collaborated with all of them. Tito should be a bigger problem for Bosniaks and most of Yugoslavia's non-Serb and non-Croat minorities. Massive cover-up of anti-Bosniak pogroms in eastern Bosnia, largely the work Serb commissars and rehabilitated chauvinists.

Post 1.46 // 26 SEP 2022 // @IkaFerrerGotic // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/IkaFerrerGotic/status/1574467185224945710>

'Oor' Ika Ferrer Gotić @IkaFerrerGotic

1/4 Did you know that rich foreigners used to pay big money to shoot at civilians in #Sarajevo during the wartime siege? It's called #SarajevoSafari | Thread.

Oversæt Tweet

Benjamina Karić @BenjaminaKacic · 26. sep.

Podnijela sam krivičnu prijavu protiv NN lica koja su sijala smrt po Sarajevu i njihovih pomagača, te odgovornih lica agresorske vojske.

Smatram svojom obavezom ovako reagirati na iznesene činjenice u dokumentarnom filmu "Sarajevo safari".

Obećano, ispunjeno.

Grad Sarajevo
City of Sarajevo

Bosna i Hercegovina
Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine
Kanton Sarajevo
Grad Sarajevo
GRADONAČELNICA

BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA
TUŽILAŠTVO BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE
Posebni odjel za ratne zločine
Kraljice Jelene 88
71000 Sarajevo

Na osnovu odredbi članova 213., 214. i 215. Zakona o krivičnom postupku BiH ("Službeni glasnik BiH", broj 3/2003, 32/2003 - ispravka, 36/2003, 26/2004, 63/2004, 13/2005, 48/2005, 46/2006, 29/2007, 53/2007, 58/2008, 12/2009, 16/2009, 53/2009 - dr. zakon, 93/2009, 72/2013 i 65/2018), koji propisuju dužnost prijavljivanja krivičnog djela, podnosim slijedeću

Post 1.47 // 7 SEP 2022 // @BalkanInsight // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/BalkanInsight/status/1567539277503807488>



Post 1.48 // 27 SEP 2022 // @JasminMuj // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/JasminMuj/status/1574814456831299585>



Post 1.49 // 29 SEP 2022 // @suljagicemir1 // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/suljagicemir1>

Full thread which @suljagicemir1 quote-tweets Martens here: <https://twitter.com/Andric1961/status/1575368736370032641>



Post 1.50 // 28 SEP 2022 // @MartaVrbetic // Twitter

Hyperlink: https://twitter.com/search?q=%40MartaVrbetic&src=typed_query



Post 1.51 // 29 SEP 2022 // @NedadMemic // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/nedadmemic>

Full thread which @nedadmemic quote-tweets the Croatian government here: <https://twitter.com/VladaRH/status/1574448815045754882>



Post 1.52 // 20 SEP 2022 // @KemalV5 // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/KemalV5/status/1572139226866540545>



Post 1.53 // 27 SEP 2022 // @JStjepandic // Twitter

Hyperlink: Full thread which @JStjepandic quote-tweets @adicerimagic, Senior Analyst at the The European Stability Initiative here: <https://twitter.com/adicerimagic/status/1572680110762754053>



Post 1.54 // 21 SEP 2022 // @_tanasic // Twitter

Hyperlink: https://twitter.com/_tanasic/status/1572661294419046400



everydaybytany
@_tanasic

...

Jelena Trivić i Stanivuković još mi iz frižidera samo ne iskaču #izbori

Post 1.55 // 3 OCT 2022 // @georgiokon // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/georgiokon/status/1576865248942096385>



Georgio Konstandi
@georgiokon

...

Dear Western media/white liberal feminists,

Please don't do a 'breaking glass ceilings' with Željka Cvijanović, the new Serb member of 🇧🇦's presidency.

ZC is a far-right separatist, Islamophobe & genocide denier. A fascist is a fascist, even if she's wearing high heels.



11.22 AM · 3. okt. 2022 · Twitter for iPhone

153 Retweets 11 Citat-Tweets 1.109 Likes

Post 1.56 // 12 SEP 2022 // @KemalSBeganovic // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/KemalSBeganovic/status/1569195639942029313>



Kemal S. Beganović
@KemalSBeganovic

...

Ja ne znam kud će, šta će: Milanović, Vučić, Dragan Čović i Borjana Krišto, Dodik i Željka Cvijanović, kad Putinovi pobjegnu iz Ukrajine glavom bez obzira? Gdje će ovi sa sobom?

7.26 AM · 12. sep. 2022 · Twitter for iPhone

2 Retweets 2 Citat-Tweets 95 Likes

Post 1.57 // 23 SEP 2022 // @TomasDarko // Twitter

Hyperlink: <https://twitter.com/TomasDarko/status/1573083138158465031>



Darko Tomaš
@TomasDarko

...

Željka Cvijanović je simbol političkog i svakog drugog poštenja i korektnosti! Iza nje ostaju i ostajeće putevi, škole, mostovi, poslovne zone, nova radna mjesta, ...

12.53 AM · 23. sep. 2022 · Twitter for iPhone

3 Retweets 2 Citat-Tweets 35 Likes

Post 1.58 // 19 SEP 2022 // @JakubJanda // Twitter

Hyperlink: https://twitter.com/_JakubJanda/status/1505244451844894721



Jakub Janda 楊雅傑
@_JakubJanda

Expect Russia and its puppet Hungary to destabilise Bosnia via its proxies like Serbian extremist Dodik.

7:06 PM · 19. mar. 2022 · Twitter Web App

77 Retweets 5 Citat-Tweets 313 Likes

Post 1.59 // 18 JUL 2022 // @markokena // Twitter

Hyperlink:

<https://twitter.com/markokena/status/1548935523347087360>




Марко Михајловић (Кена-1389) 🇷🇺 🇷🇸 🇷🇸 🇷🇸
@markokena

ЦРНА ГОРА ЈЕ СРБИЈА - РЕПУБЛИКА СРБСКА ЈЕ СРБИЈА - МАКЕДОНИЈА ЈЕ СРБИЈА - КРАЈИНА ЈЕ СРБИЈА ❤️ БОСНА И ХЕРЦЕГОВИНА ЈЕ СРБИЈА - УКРАЈИНА ЈЕ РУСИЈА, КОСОВО ЈЕ СРБИЈА. 🇷🇺 🇷🇺 🇷🇺
🇷🇺 🇷🇸

ЖИВЕЛА БРАТСКА РУСИЈА 🇷🇺 ❤️ ЖИВЕЛА МАЈКА СРБИЈА. ❤️ 🇷🇸

[Oversæt Tweet](#)



Post 1.60 // 10 AUG 2022 // @Dragan_Covic // Twitter

Hyperlink:

https://twitter.com/Dragan_Covic/status/1557340082746580992



Dragan Čović
@Dragan_Covic

Meeting with the British Ambassador to #BiH @JulianReillyUK. Pleased to welcome the Ambassador to BiH & discuss prominent topics. Constructive meeting on bilateral relations, needs for urgent stability in #BiH, reform processes, changes of Election Law & future cooperation.

[Oversæt Tweet](#)



2:16 PM · 10. aug. 2022 · Twitter for Android

3 Retweets 40 Likes